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9 
KIDS ARE DIFFERENT 
Stephen St.Vincent∗† 
The Supreme Court recently handed down its decision in Graham v. 
Florida.1 The case involved a juvenile, Graham, who was sentenced to life in 
prison after being convicted as an adult of a nonhomicidal crime. The of-
fense, a home invasion robbery, was his second; the first was attempted 
robbery. Due to Florida’s abolition of parole, the judge’s imposition of a life 
sentence meant that Graham was constructively sentenced to life without 
parole for a nonhomicide crime. Graham challenged this sentence as un-
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court invalidated Graham’s sen-
tence by a 6–3 majority. By a 5–4 majority, the Court declared the practice 
of sentencing juveniles to life without parole for nonhomicide crimes cate-
gorically unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause. Chief Justice Roberts was the lone crossover 
vote; he agreed that the sentence in Graham’s particular case violated the 
Eighth Amendment, but was unwilling to declare such sentences categori-
cally unconstitutional. Otherwise, the case was split along the traditional 
ideological lines, with Justice Kennedy playing his usual role as the swing 
vote. What makes the result in this case unusual is that the Court seems to 
have made a significant break from its past jurisprudence on sentencing. In 
fact, Graham may have completely altered the landscape of the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. While the old approach was summed up 
by the adage “death is different,” the new approach may be that “kids are 
different.” In addition, the Court may have exposed itself to a whole host of 
difficult sentencing issues down the line. 
I. The Traditional Approach: “Death is Different” 
Until Graham, the Court generally adopted a bifurcated approach to sen-
tencing, with different lines of precedent for death penalty and non-death 
penalty cases. When it came to the death penalty, the Court was willing to 
address issues categorically, not concerning itself solely with the facts of the 
case at bar. For example, in Roper v. Simmons2 the Court declared the appli-
cation of the death penalty to juveniles unconstitutional regardless of the 
underlying facts. But when it assessed nondeath sentences in the Eighth 
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Amendment context, the Court was typically far more deferential to the 
states. It had only been willing to invalidate sentences individually, and only 
then where the sentences failed an ambiguous “proportionality” standard.3 
So, for example, while the Court invalidated one sentence of life without 
parole for an offender’s seventh nonviolent crime in Solem v. Helm,4 it also 
upheld a life sentence for possession of a large quantity of cocaine in Har-
melin v. Michigan. In Graham, though, the Court was faced with, and 
upheld, a challenge that merged these two doctrines: “a categorical chal-
lenge to a term-of-years sentence.” 
Justice Thomas, filing the primary dissent in Graham, argued that the 
majority’s decision was a significant break in the Court’s jurisprudence, a 
break which he believed to be problematic. Among his other arguments, 
Justice Thomas claimed that the adage “death is different” (that the death 
penalty was treated differently by the Court than terms of years or other, less 
harsh sentences), which held favor with the Court at least until Graham, is 
itself now dead. 
The fact that death was treated differently by the Court stemmed from 
its severity. As recently as Roper, the Court has noted that “[b]ecause the 
death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies 
to it with special force.” Accordingly, a broad range of substantive and pro-
cedural rights apply to capital defendants that do not apply to other 
defendants, even those accused or convicted of homicide. The dissenters’ 
main fear going forward appears to be that the Court’s death penalty juri-
sprudence is no longer isolated from the rest of criminal procedure, and that 
one regime may slowly spill over into the other. 
II. Ideological Difficulties After GRAHAM 
The question now seems to be whether death is indeed still different. Let 
us for the sake of argument assume that the Court in its current make-up is 
willing to approach the death penalty and term-of-years sentences identical-
ly, or at the very least more similarly. Such an approach would be likely to 
have serious repercussions in its sentencing jurisprudence. By treating death 
and nondeath sentences similarly, the Court could go in one of two direc-
tions. First, it could start backpedaling on its recent decisions restricting the 
use of the death penalty, reserving categorical decisions for only the most 
barbaric of punishments (say, drawing and quartering). After all, if death is 
no longer different, the Court may see little reason to approach it with the 
more skeptical eye that it has in the recent past. This result would actually 
be a boon to the conservative wing of the Court, as it would allow the Court 
to return control over such decisions to the states and bring the Court’s in-
terpretation of the Eighth Amendment closer in line with what they believe 
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is its original meaning. It could mean the reversal of decisions such as Ro-
per and Atkins v. Virginia.5 
Of course, this is an unlikely scenario. The Court’s decisions categori-
cally restricting the death penalty, such as Roper and Atkins, have been 
decidedly fairly recently. The ideological makeup of the Court, even with 
the recent appointments of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, appears unlikely 
to change on this issue. Furthermore, the Graham decision was, if anything, 
a logical extension of Roper, so to believe that it would lead down the path 
to overruling decisions such as Roper is illogical. The Graham opinion cited 
significant language from Roper discussing the developmental issues juve-
niles face which are not present with adult offenders. It presented evidence 
that juvenile offenders still have significant amounts of psychological devel-
opment ahead of them, and that therefore the prospect of rehabilitation is 
much more realistic than it is with adult offenders. The Graham Court also 
noted that juveniles are less likely to understand the true effects and conse-
quences of their crimes than are adults, and that therefore the retributive 
value of such sentences is much lower than it is with adult offenders. Final-
ly, the Court recognized that the mental calculus of juveniles who 
contemplate criminal activity is too incomplete to fully comprehend the po-
tential consequences of such crimes. To that end, the deterrent effect of life 
sentences without parole adds little to the general deterrent effect of impri-
sonment. 
It is more likely, then, that Graham will lead to the categorical approach 
used in Roper and Atkins being taken in other non-death penalty cases. This 
is what the conservative wing of the Court fears. For example, one logical 
extension of Graham may be to categorically invalidate life without parole 
for all nonhomicidal offenders, including adults. Despite the Court’s re-
liance on the differences between juvenile offenders and adult offenders, it 
would not be too much of a stretch to envision the Court citing the rehabilit-
ative goals of imprisonment in nullifying such a practice, particularly in 
light of the fact that those imprisoned for life without parole are typically 
excluded from many of the rehabilitative activities provided, such as psy-
chological therapy and education. 
Graham may also lead to the Court taking a more liberal approach to the 
death penalty as a practice. Granted, the logical extensions are not as clear. 
But Graham could be one step in a slow shift towards mandating less and 
less severe sentences for certain classes of offenders. More prohibitions to 
the death penalty along the lines of Roper and Atkins, as well as more re-
strictions on harsh sentencing such as Graham, could be added until the 
death penalty is so restricted that it is nearly impossible to impose. This 
could eventually lead the Court to decide that the death penalty itself is arc-
haic, unproductive, and contrary to the Eighth Amendment. 
The slippery slope argument that follows is obvious. If I were a conserv-
ative leader developing talking points, I would say that the road that began 
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with Roper and continued with Graham could lead not only to the abolition 
of the death penalty altogether but to the Supreme Court (an unelected body 
drawn from the intellectual elite, I would remind the public) determining the 
appropriate sentences for every crime on the books in every state. But slip-
pery slope arguments, effective oratorical devices though they may be, 
rarely have any basis in reality. It is difficult to foresee any circumstance in 
which the Court would wish to engage in any sort of term-of-years sentenc-
ing assessments aside from the most severe or disproportionate cases. 
Still, Graham may not signal an end to the Court’s willingness to cate-
gorically invalidate nondeath sentences, especially with regard to 
nonhomicidal crimes. There are two potential philosophical approaches that 
the Court could take that would indicate this might be the case, but neither 
one of them sound in what Justice Thomas sees as the eradication of the 
“death is different” approach to sentencing. 
The first approach that the Court could take would be to maintain that 
“death is different”—just not necessarily the death of the defendant. Per-
haps, instead, it is the death of the victim that makes a case “different,” or 
the fact that the death of either the defendant or the victim is at issue. After 
all, Graham invalidated life without parole for non-homicidal cases. The 
Court said nothing about invalidating juvenile life without parole for homi-
cide offenses. This approach could be easily extended to the realm of adult 
offenders. Were the Court to adopt this extension of “death is different,” it 
would provide a clear line at which categorical inquiries would end and only 
“narrow proportionality” inquiries would exist. 
Another approach is that death is still different in the traditional sense, 
but that the Court now recognizes that kids are different as well. The Court 
could try to maintain separate jurisprudences for adult and juvenile sentenc-
ing. For adult offenders, “death is different” could be the same as it was 
before the Graham decision, and now, after Graham, juvenile offenders may 
be subject to an entirely different sentencing approach. While juvenile sen-
tencing is generally at most as harsh as adult sentencing, the Court could 
choose to vary it in several areas to demand even less harsh sentences. The 
Court has already taken two steps down this path with Graham and Roper. 
Given the language used in the majority opinion in Graham, “kids are 
different” seems to be the more likely approach. In fact, Justice Kennedy 
seemed to be fighting against the idea that the approach in Graham should 
be extended to adult offenders. He quoted numerous studies to support the 
notion that juvenile offenders are psychologically different from adult of-
fenders and that different levels and methods of incapacitation, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation are appropriate for juveniles and adults. If the Court 
wanted to, it could have easily taken the opportunity presented in Graham to 
invalidate all sentences of life without parole for nonhomicidal offenders 
regardless of age. The fact that the Court did not do so suggests that the 
Court intends to treat juvenile sentencing differently from adult sentencing. 
Having separate approaches for adult and juvenile sentencing would also 
mesh with the Court’s general Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which 
looks to evolving social standards when assessing whether a punishment is 
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constitutional. As we learn more about juvenile psychology, it stands to rea-
son that we will learn more about the appropriate punishments and 
treatments for juveniles. This may lead to our societal standards of decency 
evolving more quickly towards less harsh sentences for juveniles than for 
adults, especially if there is no corresponding evidence that adult offenders 
would benefit from the same types of punishment as juveniles. 
III. Practical Difficulties After GRAHAM 
For most states, the result in Graham is simple to follow: they can simp-
ly offer the possibility of parole to any juvenile who receives a life sentence. 
But there would still remain a whole host of potential practical issues in-
volved in nearly any sentencing scheme. 
One such practical question arises in states like Florida, which has en-
tirely abolished the practice of parole. This means that unlike other states 
which maintain their parole systems, states like Florida are categorically 
barred from sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment. The only way the 
state could now give such sentences would be to reinstitute some sort of 
parole system to handle those juveniles given life sentences for nonhomicide 
crimes. This could be a viable option, especially in light of the fact that such 
sentences are relatively rare, leaving administrative costs relatively low. 
What seems more likely is that states like Florida will simply assign 
lengthy term-of-years sentences to such offenders. Technically, a sentence of 
one hundred years’ imprisonment without the possibility of parole to a six-
teen-year-old nonhomicidal offender does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment under the letter of Graham. As Justice Alito noted in his brief 
dissent, “[n]othing in the [Graham] opinion affects the imposition of a sen-
tence to a term of years without the possibility of parole.” Certainly, though, 
such a sentence would violate the spirit of the decision. After all, a one hun-
dred year sentence is effectively a life sentence, yet a judge in any state 
would seem to be permitted to give juveniles one hundred year sentences 
without the possibility of parole. This is a glaring loophole. The Court will 
at some point be forced to address the constitutionality of juvenile sentences 
of less than life, with no possibility of parole, especially where the term of 
years is so long that it is practically a life sentence. 
It will be interesting to see what happens at Graham’s resentencing. If he 
is given a term of years sentence that is effectively a life sentence, that sen-
tence will almost certainly be challenged; Graham could find his case back 
in the Supreme Court. Regardless of whether Graham is the particular de-
fendant, a challenge of this nature is practically inevitable. The Court must 
have known this when it handed down its decision in Graham, and one 
would like to think that it has a plan for such a scenario. 
Here, if anywhere, is where the slippery slope argument is best applied. 
On the one hand, it is highly unlikely that the Court would render its own 
opinion in Graham toothless by upholding a one hundred year sentence 
without the possibility of parole to a nonhomicidal juvenile simply because 
the sentence was not styled as a life sentence. On the other hand, it is also 
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difficult to see the Court engaging in the analysis necessary to enforce Gra-
ham if the states decide to try to circumvent it. The Court would have to 
establish some sort of numerical ceiling on the length of sentences that 
could be given to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes where there is 
no possibility of parole. This kind of analysis is not one that the Court en-
gages in either routinely or eagerly. 
Another potential practical issue involves the actual likelihood of being 
paroled. If a state had parole on the books but never released anyone on pa-
role, then that state could also give sentences which are essentially life 
without parole to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes. These sen-
tences, much like a one hundred year sentence with no possibility of parole, 
would be in line with Graham in the most technical sense only. If the Court 
wished to prevent such sentences from being imposed, it would be forced to 
determine how often or under what circumstances a state must release pris-
oners on parole in order for the parole system to be considered viable. 
Again, this is not the type of analysis that the Court is well equipped to un-
dertake. 
Even if a state did have a viable parole system, a sentence could be 
structured to make parole virtually unattainable. Florida, for instance, could 
reinstitute parole for juveniles, but declare that it would only be available 
after the first hundred years of a life sentence. By reinstituting parole, Flori-
da would be technically in line with Graham, but by only allowing parole 
after such a long period of time, it would again go against the spirit of the 
decision. If the Court wanted to prevent this, it would again be forced to 
engage in some sort of line-drawing, determining how many years of a sen-
tence can be served before a meaningful opportunity for parole is presented 
to the juvenile offender. 
This practice of the Court engaging in such low-level policy determina-
tions could result in peculiar and inconsistent applications of the law. For 
example, if the Court decided that the maximum sentence for juveniles 
where there is no possibility of parole was forty years, then an odd result 
would arise. States with no possibility of parole, which presumably intended 
the lack of parole to make sentences harsher, would actually have less severe 
maximum sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes than 
states with parole systems, if parole is unlikely to ever be granted. 
Ultimately, it will be up to the states and their judges to decide how hard 
the practical issues raised by Graham will be pressed. They could decide to 
comply with the spirit of Graham across the board. But it will take only one 
rogue judge to force the Court’s hand and require it to render a difficult de-
cision that will seem unsatisfying no matter what the outcome. 
Conclusion 
The Graham decision may have created as many problems as it solved. 
The Court now faces an ideological battle as well as complex practical is-
sues going forward. Ideologically, the Court must decide whether it intends 
to create a bifurcated jurisprudence for juvenile and adult offenders. It also 
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must determine whether its traditional bifurcated approach to death and 
nondeath sentences remains viable. Practically, the Court may have opened 
the door to a whole host of problems. Should the states choose to try to cir-
cumvent Graham, for example by assessing term of years sentences so long 
as to be practically life sentences without the possibility of parole, the Court 
will either have to begin to assign a number to the otherwise generic term 
“life sentence” or develop a creative new approach that will allow it to avoid 
engaging in such difficult, low-level determinations. 
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to any of these problems, at 
least from the Court’s perspective. Based on the language used in the major-
ity opinion in Graham, the Court is at least willing to have separate 
approaches to adult and juvenile sentencing. Whether or not “death is differ-
ent” still applies remains to be seen. It seems safe to assume, though, that 
the Court now recognizes that kids are different. Given the mounting evi-
dence pointing to the psychological differences between adult and juvenile 
offenders, this is a welcome addition to the Court’s sentencing approach, in 
spite of the practical difficulties it may have raised. 
